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IT DEPEDS O WHAT THE MEAIG OF 
“FALSE” IS: FALSITY AD MISLEADIGESS 
I COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRIE 
Rebecca Tushnet∗ 
[T]he line between true and false speech is not bright. . . .  
Misleading speech is a half-breed, true in form and even in 
effect for many, but false in the impressions it creates for 
others.  All language misleads some people to some extent.  
How many are too many and how much is too much are 
questions of policy and degree.  The distinction between the 
true and the misleading is normative.
1 
The Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine2 is much 
debated, largely with a focus on the level of protection the doctrine 
allows for truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech.  Some, 
including some on the Supreme Court, attack the distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial speech as theoretically unjustified 
and practically unmanageable.3  Less often targeted by academic 
commentary is that the governing law excludes false or misleading 
commercial speech from any First Amendment protection 
whatsoever.4  This relative lack of attention has obscured the 
practical difficulties that abolishing the commercial speech doctrine 
would pose. 
This Article therefore attempts to contest the assumption in 
many discussions of commercial speech doctrine that, at the granular 
 
           * Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  Thanks to Mark Lemley, Mike 
Seidman, Mark Tushnet, and participants of the 2007 Works in Progress Intellectual Property 
Colloquium for helpful comments, and to Reed Collins for excellent research assistance. 
 1. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General 
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1218–19 (1983). 
 2. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 3. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part). 
 4. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
  
102 LOYOLA OF LOS A,GELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:nnn 
level, judgments about whether a particular advertisement is false are 
relatively easy to make.  I do so by setting forth some examples of 
fact patterns in trademark and false advertising cases that make clear 
that falsity, misleadingness, and meaning itself are often debatable.  
Relatedly, substance and speech are intertwined.  Regulation of 
commercial speech based on its capacity to mislead inevitably has 
market-shaping effects, and speech regulations implement 
substantive economic policies.  Free speech libertarianism turns out 
to condemn certain types of economic regulation. 
The murky boundary between true and false has significant 
consequences for commercial speech doctrine.  Theorists who 
believe that commercial speech should be given full First 
Amendment protection often claim, either explicitly or implicitly, 
that we need not fear the consequences of such protection for 
ordinary consumer transactions.5  A cause of action for fraud, they 
suggest, is not offensive to the First Amendment, and so the worst 
abuses of consumers’ trust can still be redressed.6  But the heightened 
scienter requirement for fraud—as compared to the generally strict 
liability that exists in trademark and consumer protection law—
combined with the inherent flexibility of language means that the 
promise of continued protection is largely illusory.  We cannot have 
much consumer protection law in a world that treats commercial 
speech like political speech.  Consider, by way of comparison, how 
 
 5. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 627, 651 (1990). 
 6. See id. (“[E]ven the most ardent libertarians agree that it is a legitimate role of 
government to prevent citizens from cheating one another. . . .  [I]t should not be difficult to tailor 
a fraud statute narrowly to suppress no more speech than is necessary.  Extending full protection 
to commercial speech, despite dire predictions from some quarters, will not give free rein to 
unscrupulous salesmen.”); see also John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based 
Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 128–29 (1996) (arguing for regulation 
limited to bans against force or fraud, though also contending that counterspeech will be more 
effective than government bans on fraud); Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: ,ot “Low Value” Speech, 
16 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 107–08, 142–44 (1999) (arguing that the division between regulable and 
unregulable speech should be falsity and truth, not commerciality and noncommerciality); Scott 
Wellikoff, Mixed Speech: Inequities that Result from an Ambiguous Doctrine, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. 
LEGAL COMMENT. 159, 192–93 (2004) (“Attaching full First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech does not prevent the government from punishing a commercial speaker for 
relaying false and misleading information.  Fraud of this type is covered by a wide variety of 
rules and regulations that do not implicate First Amendment issues. . . .  Creating a fraud statute is 
thus possible and should be considered as an alternative to distinguishing commercial and 
noncommercial speech.”). 
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much of a constraint libel law imposes on what politicians say about 
each other. 
We must choose between the difficult line-drawing problems 
that the commercial speech doctrine creates and the consumer 
protection objectives served by modern commercial speech 
regulation.7  Some will conclude that the law should treat drug 
advertisements just like electioneering, but at least the costs of doing 
so will be clear.  My own view is that, though excluding false and 
misleading commercial speech from constitutional protection has 
significant costs when legislatures, agencies, or juries make mistakes 
about what is false, those costs are similar to the harms of other 
mistaken economic policies.  We are better off overall in a system 
that regulates false and misleading commercial speech without 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny. 
I.  THE POWER TO DEFINE AND THE POWER TO DECEIVE 
Sellers’ speech affects buyers’ decisions.  False speech thus can 
cause harm.  But how do we know when a claim is false or 
misleading?  Underlying advertising regulation, or any inquiry into 
falsity, is a struggle over meaning.  This section considers the 
relationship between definition and deception, which is often at the 
core of false advertising cases. I begin with two relevant examples of 
controversial attempts to define terms.  First, Bill Clinton’s notorious 
claim that “[i]t depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is.”8  
This statement seems inherently funny and evasive, not least because 
 
 7. We could, of course, do something in between these two options: we could raise the 
standard required before commercial speech could be regulated but not give it full political 
speech-like protection.  However, this approach would deprive us of many of the benefits of 
consumer protection law and leave us with similar line-drawing problems. 
 8. Transcript of Videotaped Testimony of William Jefferson Clinton Before the Grand Jury 
Empanelled for Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr (Aug. 17, 1998), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ 
transcr.htm.  Clinton gave this response to the question: “Whether or not Mr. Bennett knew of 
your relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, the statement that there was ‘no sex of any kind in any 
manner, shape or form, with President Clinton,’ was an utterly false statement.  Is that correct?”  
Id.  In the context of a deposition, a legal proceeding in which deponents are generally allowed to 
evade unless pinned down precisely, and in which the standard at issue is that governing perjury, 
Clinton’s parsing may have made more sense.  But in the court of public opinion, he came off 
badly.  See, e.g., Timothy Noah, Bill Clinton and the Meaning of “Is,” SLATE, Sept. 13, 1998, 
http://www.slate.com/id/1000162/ (“Years from now, when we look back on Bill Clinton’s 
presidency, its defining moment may well be Clinton’s rationalization to the grand jury about 
why he wasn’t lying . . . .”); ,otebook: Tom’s War, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 21, 2003, at 8 (“Bill 
Clinton’s contention that ‘it depends on what the meaning of the word “is” is’ captured forever 
his evasiveness and moral relativism . . . .”). 
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he is using “is” the second time as if we all know what it means.  
Clinton was playing tricks with language, trying to justify an earlier 
lie by injecting some ambiguity into it.  Clinton’s fancy footwork is 
an example of deceptiveness, if not outright falsity.  It is an example 
of using definitions to obfuscate and deceive. 
The second example is more complicated.  It is a well-known 
quotation from Through the Looking Glass, featuring Humpty 
Dumpty and Alice: 
“There’s glory for you!” 
 “I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory,’” Alice said. 
 Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course 
you don’t—till I tell you.  I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-
down argument for you!’” 
 “But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down 
argument,’” Alice objected. 
 “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a 
scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—
neither more nor less.” 
 “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make 
words mean so many different things.” 
 “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to 
be master—that’s all.”9 
The key parts of this dialogue fit well with modern concepts of the 
power of language to produce substantive outcomes by shaping our 
understanding of the issues.10  These lines are quoted hundreds of 
times in law review articles,11 usually as a disparaging reference to 
some strained or counterintuitive interpretation of a term. 
But Humpty is not engaged in an inherently illegitimate 
enterprise: it’s the combination of his undisclosed private meaning 
 
 9. LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE: ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & 
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 268–69 (Carkson N. Potter, Inc. 1960) (1872). 
 10. George Orwell’s Politics and the English Language is a foundational text here.  See 4 
GEORGE ORWELL, Politics and the English Language, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM 
AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL: IN FRONT OF YOUR NOSE, 1945–1950, at 127 (Sonia Orwell 
& Ian Angus eds., 1968).  See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: 
KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (Chelsea Green Publ’g Co. 2004); GEORGE 
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (2d ed. 2003). 
 11. A search for “just what I choose it to mean” in Westlaw’s JLR database on October 6, 
2007, produced 343 results. 
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and Alice’s pre-existing expectation that makes his use of “glory” 
infelicitous.  Humpty’s use of “glory” is not even misleading, 
because it obviously doesn’t mislead Alice, but is simply a poor 
method of communication.12  In other circumstances, it’s perfectly 
reasonable to define a word for your purposes.  Alice’s interaction 
with Humpty, indeed, continues beyond this oft-quoted exchange: 
because he knows so much about words, she asks him to explain 
Jabberwocky, which is full of new words, and Humpty provides the 
now-standard definitions of Lewis Carroll’s various coinages.13  Not 
only does Alice think that Humpty can be a reliable source of 
meaning, we do too. 
While Humpty’s “there’s glory for you!”14 is a misstatement, 
“there’s a TiVo for you!” or “there’s a GPS receiver for you!” can be 
intelligible and even helpful.  “Which is to be master” is an 
important question that must be answered, not dismissed.  In 
regulations of commercial speech, the question is under what 
circumstances we will allow individual commercial speakers to 
define terms or use them without defining them, as we allow people 
to define and use terms like “Democrat” or “family values.” 
II.  DEFINITION OF TERMS IN ADVERTISING LAW 
Some of the examples that follow came up in other presentations 
at the conference that produced this Symposium.  Often, discussions 
at a high level of abstraction set aside problems of determining 
falsity in individual cases, presuming that some factfinder can 
determine deceptiveness with relative ease.  In practice, however, 
many cases will not be that easy to resolve, even though we may 
want the government to step in and regulate. 
A.  Individual Cases 
Consumer and competitor lawsuits for false advertising are 
perhaps easiest to fit into the fraud model advocated by those who 
favor maximum protection for commercial speech.  It should be 
 
 12. Cf. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co. v. Hoover Co., 845 F. Supp. 469, 480–83 (N.D. Ohio 
1994) (finding a vacuum cleaner manufacturer’s idiosyncratic “formula,” concocted to measure 
the cleaning power of its vacuum cleaners, was likely to confuse consumers, but not necessarily 
to mislead them, because the information wasn’t useful). 
 13. CARROLL, supra note 9, at 270–75. 
 14. Id. at 268. 
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noted, however, that doctrinal innovations have decreased a false 
advertising plaintiff’s burden as compared to the plaintiff’s burden in 
a common law action for fraud.  These innovations range from 
relaxing reliance standards to imposing strict liability for untrue 
statements that cause harm.  In the interests of brevity, I will not here 
focus on those aspects of consumer protection and unfair competition 
law, but they interact with the inherent difficulties of determining 
falsity.  If they were abandoned in order to bring advertising law 
closer to core First Amendment fields like libel, that change would 
magnify the problems of determining the truth or falsity of the 
routine advertising statements at issue in these cases. 
This section identifies a number of terms that have generated 
private lawsuits or controversies focusing on a particular seller.  
Contested terms regularly have at least two plausible meanings: one 
which makes an advertisement deceptive and another which renders 
it truthful.  Deciding which meaning to accept as legally binding can 
be a difficult enterprise. 
From trademark law comes the example of “Glass Wax,” for a 
car polish that contains no wax.15  What does it mean to wax your 
car?  Can you wax your car without using wax, or is “Glass Wax” a 
deceptive name undeserving of trademark protection?  Ultimately, 
trademark’s answer is that the mark is valid,16 but that’s not obvious.  
The world of high-end wine brings different naming questions: 
grapes from a vineyard are used to make wine under a separate 
name; the vineyard becomes famous; is it truthful to re-label the 
wine with the vineyard’s name?17 
Many trademark doctrines are designed to select between 
competing meanings and fix one as legally truthful.  The doctrine of 
descriptive fair use, for example, deals with terms that have both 
trademark and non-trademark meaning, such as SweeTarts candies.  
 
 15. Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955).  But see Hot Wax, Inc. v. S/S 
Car Care, No. 97 C 6879, 1999 WL 966094, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 1999) (upholding a jury 
finding of explicit falsity when supposed “wax” product instead contained mineral seal oil). 
 16. See Gold Seal, 129 F. Supp. at 933–34 (finding that the mark “Glass Wax” was not 
deceptive). 
 17. See Mike Steinberger, Excuse Me, Waiter, There’s Fake Wine in My Glass, SLATE, Sept. 
12 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2173361/pagenum/2/ (“Sixty years ago, many now-venerable 
wineries such as Lafleur, Petrus, and Cheval Blanc sold much of their production in bulk to 
merchants and private clients who bottled the stuff themselves. . . .  [One expert] suggests that 
some wineries are embarrassed by the fact that economic circumstances once obliged them to sell 
in bulk and are thus eager to disavow older wines that they didn’t bottle themselves.”). 
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Use of such a term on another product, such as a “sweet-tart” 
cranberry drink, can be literally true, yet also possibly confusing if 
consumers believe that the trademark owner endorses the second 
product.18  In other cases, trademarks may be used in ways that are 
literally true but may falsely imply endorsement or sponsorship, such 
as a car ad that compares its repeated success in independent 
evaluations with a basketball player’s repeated success on the court.19 
We could separate denotation and connotation; arguably, 
connotation is more problematic because it opens up many more 
possible meanings, such as the implicit claims of endorsement 
commonly alleged in trademark cases.  Yet even denotation produces 
legal battles, because the conceptual line between denotation and 
connotation is less important to deception than actual consumer 
understanding. 
For example, false advertising cases can pit technical versus lay 
definitions.  “Catastrophic failure” can technically mean sudden 
failure,20 but medical professionals think of it as involving serious 
equipment damage or patient injury.21  When a medical equipment 
producer advertised that its competitor’s product suffered 
“catastrophic failure,” relying on the technical meaning, a court 
found this deceptive.22  Another case required a court to evaluate the 
nature of “cashmere.”23  If cashmere is “recycled”—the fibers torn 
apart and reprocessed, creating a cheaper product missing some of 
the characteristics of unrecycled cashmere—can it still be labeled 
“cashmere?”  The answer depends on what the meaning of 
“cashmere” is, and the law—along with consumer expectations 
engendered by the law—establishes that meaning.24 
 
 18. See Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(finding no actionable confusion). 
 19. See Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding 
material issues of fact on false endorsement claim). 
 20. Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Med. Sys., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 724, 729 (N.D. Ga. 1991) 
(noting that technical dictionary definitions include “a sudden failure without warning, as 
opposed to degradation failure”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 729–30, 733. 
 23. Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 315–16 (1st Cir. 
2002). 
 24. See id. (finding that under a statute requiring “recycled” fabrics to be labeled as such, the 
unadorned word “cashmere” falsely indicated that the garments were made of virgin cashmere; 
but were it not for the set of expectations created by the statute, the “cashmere” label would be 
literally true, as the garments did contain recycled cashmere). 
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“Recycled,” in its more conventional sense, along with other 
“green” advertising claims, has generated substantial discussion and 
regulation.25  Sometimes advertisers have idiosyncratic—even 
Clintonesque—definitions of terms like “recycling,” as with 
Lexmark’s contention that incinerating used printer cartridges 
constitutes “thermal recycling,” thus legitimating its ads claiming 
that Lexmark “recycles” cartridges.26  If a substantial percentage of 
its customers (most courts accept 15–20 percent as a substantial 
percentage)27 believe that “recycling” means something other than 
reducing plastic to ash, Lexmark is engaged in false advertising in 
violation of the Lanham Act.28 
The Body Shop got in some hot water years back because of its 
interpretation of the phrase “not tested on animals.”  The Body Shop 
touted its products with this phrase because they hadn’t been tested 
on animals.  Some of their ingredients, however, were regarded as 
safe for cosmetic use because they had been tested on animals by 
others, and The Body Shop relied on that data.29  Is the phrase “not 
tested on animals” true or false as applied to The Body Shop 
products? 
Other interest groups have very different concerns, but they still 
face problems of definition when they try to promote their values 
with their consumption choices.  A number of businesses advertise 
themselves as “Christian” or incorporate Christian symbols into their 
 
 25. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 260.1–.8 (2007); Guidance for the Use of the Terms “Recycled” and 
“Recyclable” and the Recycling Emblem in Environmental Marketing Claims, 56 Fed. Reg. 
49,992 (Oct. 2, 1991); see also Performance Indus., Inc. v. Koos, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1767, 1771 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (“In today’s environmentally conscious world, [false claims 
regarding EPA approval] are serious misrepresentations.  Consumers these days seem to favor 
products that are environmentally benign and to disdain those that are environmentally harsh.”).  
See generally E. Howard Barnett, Green with Envy: The FTC, the EPA, the States, and the 
Regulation of Environmental Marketing, 1 ENVTL. LAW. 491 (1995) (discussing the increased 
marketing of products using environmental claims and the varied regulations of that marketing, 
and arguing that only uniform regulation will be effective at furthering environmental policies). 
 26. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 861, 887 
(E.D. Ky. 2007).  Of course, Lexmark advertises that it “recycles” cartridges, not that it 
“thermally recycles” them, which suggests some doubt about whether its customers share its 
interpretation of the term. 
 27. McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 28. Id. at 889–90. 
 29. Judith Valente, Body Shop Has a Few Aches and Pains, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1993, at 
B1. 
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advertising.30  But as we know from political debates, not everyone 
agrees on the boundaries of Christianity.  Some non-Mormons would 
exclude Latter-Day Saints from the fold, and James Dobson, the 
leader of Focus on the Family, stated that he didn’t consider former 
presidential hopeful Fred Thompson a Christian, apparently because 
Thompson did not evangelize.31  This is an instance in which current 
advertising law would probably refuse to find that “Christian” is a 
factual claim that could be falsified,32 but substantial numbers of 
people feel competent to evaluate others’ Christianity.33  And courts 
have, despite the religious freedom issues, intervened in disputes 
over kosher certifications.34 
 
 30. See, e.g., Amanda Greene, Cross Promotion, STAR-NEWS (Wilmington, N.C.), Aug. 26, 
2006, at 1D (“[A]n increasing number of local businesses adorn[] their work trucks or newspaper 
advertisements with Christian symbols such as a fish or a cross to identify their religious 
philosophy.  For many of these businesses, it’s a way of saying they stand for the values in the 10 
Commandments, such as honesty, integrity and loving kindness.  It’s also a bit of PR—attempting 
to change the public’s sometimes tawdry view of some service workers such as plumbers or 
mechanics.  And in the midst of the Bible-belted South, there’s a niche to be captured.”). 
 31. See Dan Gilgoff, What Is a ‘Real’ Christian? And How Might This Question Affect the 
GOP Presidential Field?, USA TODAY, May 21, 2007, at 15A. 
 32. Advertising law distinguishes fact from opinion, and, though the line can be unclear, a 
court would likely call “Christian” an opinion, since the dispute is generally about whether 
someone is a “real” or “good” Christian, and that is hard to prove false in a secular court.  See, 
e.g., Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that a statement of fact is a “specific and measurable claim, capable of being proved 
false or of being reasonably interpreted as a statement of objective fact”); Presidio Enters., Inc. v. 
Warner Bros. Distrib. Corp., 784 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 1986) (“A statement of fact is one that 
(1) admits of being adjudged true or false in a way that (2) admits of empirical verification.”). 
 33. See Gilgoff, supra note 31 (“‘Evangelicals have always had a pretty narrow 
understanding of who is a Christian in the proper sense of the term,’ says University of Notre 
Dame historian Mark Noll. ‘Catholics and most Lutherans and Episcopalians would say that 
anyone who has been baptized is a Christian, but most evangelicals would not agree.  They see 
baptism as an initiation ceremony that may or may not indicate the presence of true faith.’ That 
explains why it’s commonplace today to hear evangelicals use the word ‘Christian’ to refer 
exclusively to fellow evangelicals, as opposed to Catholics or members of mainline Protestant 
churches.  Indeed, when asked whether Focus on the Family considered 2004 Democratic 
nominee John Kerry, a Catholic, to be Christian, Focus spokesman Gary Schneeberger said he’d 
rather not answer.”). 
 34. See Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass’n of Am., 104 F.3d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1997) (dealing 
with accusations that one kosher certification group’s mark infringed another’s); Donel Corp. v. 
Kosher Overseers Ass’n of Am., No. 92CIV8377DLCHBP, 2001 WL 1512589 (S.D.N.Y. Nov 
28, 2001).  On the other hand, state regulations defining “kosher” for purposes of consumer 
protection have been struck down as a violation of the First Amendment’s protection against 
establishment of religion.  See Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 
425 (2d Cir. 2002) (invalidating New York’s kosher fraud laws); Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher 
Meat and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1346 (4th Cir. 1995) (invalidating Baltimore’s ordinance).  
I thank Eric Goldman for suggesting this point. 
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Sometimes definitions differ among groups, with consumers 
diverging from more specialized buyers.35  Kraft General Foods, Inc. 
v. Del Monte Corp.,36 for example, involved Kraft’s challenge to Del 
Monte’s use of the word “gelatin” to describe its carageenan-based 
snacks.  Carageenan is a substance derived from seaweed that lacks 
some of the characteristics of traditional animal-based gelatin.37  
Industry definitions clearly preferred limiting the term “gelatin” to 
animal-based products.38  The court enjoined the use of the term 
based on industry practice, despite the fact that the product was 
directed to ordinary consumers who, the court had explicitly found, 
could not be confused because they had no particular beliefs about 
the composition of “gelatin.”39  The court did find that carageenan 
and animal-based “gelatins” differed in taste, which might support a 
finding of falsity if consumers who had no expectations about the 
composition of gelatin nonetheless had unmet expectations about its 
taste.40  To determine falsity, in other words, the inquiry must go 
beyond dictionary definitions and determine how audiences make 
meaning in their particular circumstances. 
False advertising claims have increasingly become part of one of 
our most controversial public policy issues.  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court recently decided a case about what a doctor must tell 
a patient before an abortion.41  The plaintiff argued that, if she’d 
known that a fetus was a human being, she wouldn’t have agreed to 
an abortion.42  The doctor argued that requiring such a statement 
would force him to take a controversial moral and ethical position, 
and that in any event the patient must have known that a pregnancy 
 
 35. See, e.g., Plough, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 532 F. Supp. 714, 717–18 
(D. Del. 1982) (where the falsity of a claim made to wholesalers and retail chains depended on 
the definition of “sunscreen,” the court did not rely on the FDA’s proposed definition, but 
accepted testimony about industry norms and found that the term was not false when directed at 
expert buyers). 
 36. 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 37. Both gelatin and carageenan can be used to absorb water and suspend other ingredients 
in a firm matrix, but they differ chemically; gelatin is a protein and carageenan is a carbohydrate, 
with associated caloric differences; and gelatin dissolves below body temperature while 
carageenan dissolves above body temperature, causing taste differences.  See id. at 1458. 
 38. Id. at 1459. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1460. 
 41. See Acuna v. Turkish (Acuna III), 930 A.2d 416 (N.J. 2007). 
 42. Acuna v. Turkish (Acuna II), 894 A.2d 1208, 1210–13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), 
cert. granted, 902 A.2d 1234 (N.J. 2006), dismissed, 915 A.2d 1045 (N.J. 2006). 
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at term would produce a baby.43  The court held that the disclosures 
the plaintiff sought addressed ethical, not factual, issues, and that 
therefore her doctor did not violate any duty to inform her.44  Though 
the disclosures she sought were framed in factual terms—the embryo 
is a “human being,” abortion will kill a “family member”45—they 
were designed to suggest that women and their doctors are 
committing murder.46  The court concluded, in essence, that the 
factual disclosures sought were really about affecting women’s 
preferences, and the common law did not require this.47 
This lawsuit was not an isolated event, but rather part of an 
overall regulatory strategy designed to discourage abortion, in which 
consumer protection law is used as part of the anti-abortion toolset.48  
For example, South Dakota’s informed consent statute mandates that 
a doctor cannot perform an abortion without informing a patient that 
she is terminating the life of “a whole, separate, unique, living 
human being,” and that abortion may cause a significant risk of 
psychological trauma (a claim that is not representative of the 
medical consensus on the risks of abortion).49  We don’t generally 
think of doctor-patient interactions as instances of commercial 
speech, but the problems of regulating what can be said about a 
service provided for money are very similar.50  Though the 
preference-shaping effects of these particular disclosures are 
apparent, the inextricable link between facts and preferences recurs 
throughout advertising regulation. 
This last example is also a useful reminder that liberal political 
bents are not the only source of commercial speech regulation.  
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Acuna III, 930 A.2d at 427–28. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 418. 
 47. Id. at 427–28. 
 48. See generally Reva B. Siegel, The ,ew Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of 
Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (analyzing abortion 
regulations framed as patient protection measures). 
 49. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2007); see Robert Post, Informed Consent to 
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 
974–80 (arguing that such requirements violate doctors’ First Amendment rights and analogizing 
to commercial speech doctrine). 
 50. See Post, supra note 49, at 974–79 (analogizing doctor-patient speech to commercial 
speech); cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705 (3d Cir. 1991) (“This case involves 
commercial speech, and the clinics do not dispute this point.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on 
other grounds, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Prohibitions on false advertising can serve conservative ends, or even 
private interests (whether competitors’ or consumers’) that do not 
have readily identifiable political valences.  Advertising claims come 
in infinite varieties, and so do false advertising claims. 
B.  Standard-Setting 
Where advertising implicates broader political issues, however, 
legislatures often step in to address it.  A key issue in advertising law 
is whether regulation of deception can be wholesale or retail. 
Restrictions on “Made in U.S.A.” and similar labels offer a 
complex series of tradeoffs.  California has a particularly restrictive 
law that bars labeling products as “Made in U.S.A.” unless the 
overall product and the parts are substantially made in the U.S.51  In a 
recent case, a California appeals court sustained this law against a 
First Amendment challenge.52  The court ruled that the legislature 
could determine that, as a general matter, merchandise not meeting 
the statute’s restrictive definition would be deceptively labeled if 
advertised as “Made in U.S.A.”53  Thus, though the plaintiff had to 
meet standing requirements showing that he’d been harmed by the 
misrepresentation, he could rely on the statutory definition to 
establish that the defendants violated the law by using “Made in 
U.S.A.” and “All American-Made” on products using Taiwanese-
made screws and parts sub-assembled in Mexico. 
A dissenting judge pointed out that this interpretation of the 
labeling law might have counterproductive substantive effects.54  If 
producers can’t use some foreign parts—which may be unavailable 
or prohibitively expensive from U.S. sources—and still use the 
“Made in U.S.A.” label to sell the product, they might as well move 
the entire production out of the country, where it will at least be 
cheaper.  If, as seems likely, the law was designed both to protect 
consumers and to encourage U.S. manufacture, a restrictive 
interpretation of the law will disserve the latter goal. 
 
 51. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17533.7 (Deering 2007). 
 52. See Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 284 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 53. See id. at 294 (holding that the law “constitutes a legislative determination that 
representations suggesting merchandise was made in the United States are misleading unless the 
producer’s manufacturing processes satisfy the strictures of the statute”). 
 54. Id. at 307–08. 
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But, to the extent that the law is directed at consumer protection, 
calibrating it to promote domestic production will be extremely 
difficult.  Producers who could use “Made in U.S.A.” if their 
products had 40 percent or even 10 percent U.S. content might also 
keep some jobs in the U.S. that would otherwise go overseas.  Yet if 
consumers expect “Made in U.S.A.” products to be made entirely or 
almost entirely of U.S.-made parts, then a label that incentivizes 
producers to keep some jobs in the U.S. might still be deceptive.  
Because regulations on the advertising use of particular terms often 
aim both to protect consumers from deception and to encourage 
producers to make products with certain components, this problem is 
a recurrent one.  If, however, legislatures choose definitions that 
protect consumer expectations, the fact that regulations might not be 
efficient is not a free speech argument against them.  The First 
Amendment is not industrial policy. 
By contrast to the California appeal court’s deference to 
legislative judgment, a recent Fifth Circuit case (the “Cajun case”) 
decided that it was not inherently misleading to label Chinese catfish 
“Cajun.”55  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that 
Louisiana’s Cajun Statute56 was an unconstitutional regulation of 
commercial speech.57  As a result, a seafood importer was free to use 
“Cajun” as a trademark for its catfish, even though they are from 
China, not Louisiana, and even though they are actually of a different 
species than the domestic fish known as catfish.  Internationally, the 
trend is the other way—nations increasingly protect “geographical 
indications” or designations of origin on the theory that an essential 
component of many products, especially food products, is geographic 
origin, regardless of whether anyone can identify particular effects of 
origin on other qualities such as taste or ingredients.58  Despite the 
widespread success of the proposition that fixing the meaning of 
 
 55. Piazza’s Seafood World, LLC v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 56. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4617(D) (2007) (“No person shall advertise, sell, offer or 
expose for sale, or distribute food or food products as ‘Cajun’, ‘Louisiana Creole’, or any 
derivative thereof unless the food or food product . . . [was] produced, processed, or manu-
factured in Louisiana . . . .”). 
 57. Piazza’s Seafood, 448 F.3d at 752–53. 
 58. See generally Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate 
About Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2006) (discussing the evidence that 
geography provides unique qualities to products, and concluding that it generally does not—
certainly not in the view of the average consumer). 
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geographical indications protects and informs consumers, the Fifth 
Circuit did not give any weight to the Louisiana legislature’s specific 
judgment about the meaning of “Cajun.” 
The Cajun case’s refusal to accept blanket bans on terms is in 
tension with the “Made in U.S.A.” decision, which accepted a 
legislative determination that “Made in U.S.A.” and similar terms 
would invariably be misleading unless used according to the 
statutory definition.59  Similarly, the Supreme Court, in San 
Francisco Arts & Athletics Inc. v. United States Olympic 
Committee,60 accepted that “Congress reasonably could conclude that 
most commercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols are likely 
to be confusing,”61 which justified upholding a special law giving 
complete control over commercial uses of the term “Olympic” to the 
U.S. Olympic Committee, regardless of whether confusion or other 
harm was shown in a particular case.62 
These categorical determinations of misleadingness are far from 
isolated incidents.  Regulation-by-definition is common, and requires 
lawmakers to endorse one meaning at the expense of others.  
Consider moral and environmental claims such as “dolphin-free 
tuna”: one possible definition of dolphin-free tuna is tuna caught in a 
net that didn’t happen to kill any dolphins.  If the net brings up a 
dolphin, you throw out the whole catch.  This understanding of 
“dolphin-free tuna” doesn’t address the fundamental objection that 
the method of catching the tuna routinely and predictably kills a lot 
of dolphins.  However, it remains the case that the cans of tuna don’t 
have any dolphins in them and did not even need to have dead 
dolphins picked out of them.63  Because of likely audience 
understanding, tuna caught this way is not “dolphin-free.”  In order 
to end semantic disputes, Congress passed a law defining dolphin-
free tuna.64 
 
 59. Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 284, 294 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 60. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 61. Id. at 539. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See generally Julie Deardorff, U.S. Loosens Definition of Dolphin-Safe Tuna; 
Environmentalists Will Fight Change, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 2003, at C11 (describing the Commerce 
Department’s decision to allow tuna to carry the “dolphin-safe” label even when it was caught in 
nets that ensnared dolphins—provided that the dolphins were not injured or killed in the process). 
 64. See Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385(b)(3) (2007). 
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There has also been substantial debate over the proper definition 
of “organic,” an official definition of which has now been adopted by 
the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”).65  
Historically, organic foods faced market difficulties because of a 
proliferation of standards, which led to consumer suspicion that the 
organic label was meaningless.66  Currently, products not meeting 
USDA standards, but meeting some other definition of “organic,” 
cannot be labeled organic.67  Organic products must have at least 95 
percent organic content, but the remainder can be non-organic if it is 
on an approved list of ingredients without reasonably available 
organic substitutes.68  That list is itself controversial, since interested 
parties dispute whether or not various ingredients are available in 
organic form.69  In addition, “made with organic” is a separate 
standard, requiring at least 70 percent organic content.70 
The overall effects of the organic regulations are hard to predict.  
One effect is to decrease producers’ incentives to make processed 
food with organic content below the threshold, because they can’t 
truthfully advertise the organic content and organic food is more 
expensive.  At the same time, the “made with organic” rules may 
also encourage producers to make more products with 70 percent or 
 
 65. Organic Production and Handling Requirements, 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.200–.299 (2007) 
(prescribing detailed requirements for the production and handling of food sold as “organic”); see 
also Chad M. Kruse, Comment, The ,ot-So-Organic Dairy Regulations of the Organic Food 
Production Act of 1990, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 501, 503–26 (2006) (describing the development of the 
organic dairy regulations). 
 66. Donald T. Hornstein, The Road Also Taken: Lessons from Organic Agriculture for 
Market- and Risk-Based Regulation, 56 DUKE L.J. 1541, 1550 (2007) (“The OFPA is a 
marketing-oriented statute designed to regularize what was at the time a potentially confusing 
Babel of competing standards with an official federal ‘organic’ label.  [A] federal label [was] 
thought useful in promoting consumer confidence in the growing organic industry within the 
United States . . . .”); Elaine Marie Lipson, One ,ation, Organically Grown, http:// 
www.organicvalley.coop/resources/reading-room/lipson/page-1 (last visited Oct. 6, 2007) 
(“[S]everal dozen different private and state organic certification bodies provided third-party 
organic certification . . . .  While standards did tend to be similar, they were not uniform.  And 
because not all organic foods were certified . . . it was sometimes said that organic ‘didn’t mean 
anything.’”). 
 67. Labels, Labeling, and Market Information, 7 C.F.R. § 205.300 (2007). 
 68. See id. § 205.301(b). 
 69. See Andrew Martin, ,onorganic Exceptions Ruffle Enthusiasts of Organic Food, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2007, at C2. 
 70. 7 C.F.R. § 205.301(c); see Consumers Union’s ,EW Survey Results on Consumer 
Perception of “Organic,” Oct. 2005, http://www.eco-labels.org/focus.cfm?FocusID=22 (“74% of 
consumers say they do not expect food labeled as ‘made with organic’ to contain artificial 
ingredients.”). 
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greater organic content, even if they cost more than a 60 percent 
organic product, and discourage them from adding a tiny bit of 
organic material to a conventional product.  Consumers may well 
benefit from a fairly high threshold, since a 10 percent organic 
product may not satisfy consumer expectations for “organic.”  
Moreover, in the absence of a uniform definition, many people 
would find it too difficult to sort through varying claims and would 
either mistakenly discount all such claims or mistakenly accept them.  
In other words, the “market for lemons” problem71 can be avoided in 
the market for organic lemons, but only if each consumer doesn’t 
have to parse the definition of organic. 
Separately, the ability to use a small percentage of non-organic 
ingredients may encourage more makers of multi-ingredient, 
processed food to enter the organic market.  However,  it also risks 
confusing consumers who, for example, expect that their organic 
sausages will be made entirely from organic meat and not include 
inorganic casings.72  Another specific example from the USDA’s 
proposed list of exempt ingredients73 is hops.  Exempting hops may 
make it more difficult for small producers of fully organic beer to 
compete against large firms that use the maximum amount of 
nonorganic hops, which cost half as much as organic hops,74 even as 
it encourages the production of more “organic” beers.75  Because 
both sets of producers can advertise “organic” beer, the regulation 
 
 71. Cf. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (positing that when product quality varies and consumers 
know that producers have superior quality information, good-quality products will be driven out 
of the market). 
 72. See, e.g., Organic Consumers Ass’n, Alert: Another Sneak Attack on Organic Standards: 
USDA to Allow More Conventional Ingredients in Organics, http://www.democracyinaction.org/ 
dia/organizationsORG/oca/campaign.jsp?campaign_KEY=11401 (last visited Oct. 6, 2007) 
(criticizing proposed rules on casings from animal intestines); cf. Consumers Union’s ,EW 
Survey Results on Consumer Perception of “Organic,” supra note 70. 
 73. See National Organic Program (NOP)—Proposed Amendments to the National List of 
Allowed and Prohibited Substances (Processing), 72 Fed. Reg. 27,252 (proposed May 15, 2007) 
(to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 74. See Organic Consumers Ass’n, supra note 72. 
 75. Similar tradeoffs abound throughout the production cycle: the more requirements 
imposed on the production of “organic” food, the more barriers there are to switching from 
conventional production methods, decreasing the supply but increasing the ideological purity of 
what makes it to the market.  Producers who can’t use the organic label have few incentives to 
take half measures, for example by feeding their cows mostly on organic feed, because they can’t 
advertise their products as partly organic.  See, e.g., Kruse, supra note 65, at 515 (noting that 
stricter organic standards create barriers to converting from conventional to organic production). 
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may either aid consumers or deceive them, depending on what they 
think organic means. 
The issue of consumer response to standard-setting is worth 
further discussion to show just how hard the problem is.  By setting a 
standard, the government establishes what “organic” means.  If 
people misunderstand the term—in other words, if they continue to 
give a different meaning to it—there is an information problem that 
leads to inefficient results.  If people do not understand the term but 
nonetheless rely on it, then a key question is whether the government 
has gotten the social policy producing the underlying definition right.  
Moreover, the correctness of the government’s definition has to be 
compared to the situation without regulation, in which producers 
could give the term multiple meanings as long as they were not 
intentionally fraudulent.  If consumers still relied on the term without 
understanding it or understanding that different producers were using 
different definitions, the welfare effects would change, but not 
obviously in any particular direction.  To this must be added the 
likelihood that consumers would discount the term “organic” if they 
believed it to be self-defined, moderating both the harms and benefits 
of varying definitions.76  Only if consumers carefully research 
multiple meanings of unregulated terms—and only if they do this 
again and again, for each term that makes a difference to them—can 
we expect the unregulated market to beat the government 
systematically in shaping meaning. 
Other food labeling rules have similarly complicated effects.  
USDA grades of meat are designed to standardize meaning, so the 
USDA does not allow alternative definitions of “prime,” “choice,” 
and the like.77  There is some evidence that the grades help many 
consumers,78 but there are other ways to evaluate beef characteristics 
 
 76. See supra note 66. 
 77. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MEAT GRADING & CERT. BRANCH, REQUIREMENTS FOR 
GRADING TERMS ON MEAT PRODUCT LABELING (2006), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/ 
Lsg/mgc/instructions/100docs/MGC107.htm (“Uniform meat grade identification provides a 
standardized way of communicating values between buyers and sellers . . . .  To identify and 
segregate product by attributes, only official standards . . . can be used.”). 
 78. See, e.g., J.M. Behrends et al., Beef Customer Satisfaction: USDA Quality Grade and 
Marination Effects on Consumer Evaluations of Top Round Steaks, 83 J. ANIMAL SCI. 662, 665 
(2005) (grades generally correlated with average consumer satisfaction); cf. K.M. Killinger et al., 
Consumer Sensory Acceptance and Value for Beef Steaks of Similar Tenderness, but Differing in 
Marbling Level and Color, 82 J. ANIMAL SCI. 3294, 3294 (2004) (some consumers consistently 
prefer “lower” grades); John A. Miller et al., USDA Beef Grading: A Failure in Consumer 
Information?, 40 J. MARKETING 25, 27–29 (1976) (finding that women knew the USDA system, 
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and quality.79  Standardizing beef grades competes with the 
presentation of other information and may create switching costs for 
consumers if producers try to differentiate their beef using other 
metrics.80  Labeling may also indirectly shape consumer choice 
because retailers will only carry certain products, such as meat 
labeled “USDA Choice.”81  Related disputes show up in the debate 
over whether all beef producers should be compelled to support 
generic beef promotion.  Smaller producers often believe that not all 
beef is equal, and that generic promotions distort consumer 
perceptions about the variations in beef.82 
Labels can also function as warnings, even without explicit 
evaluative statements.  Dairy producers who use recombinant bovine 
growth hormone (“rBST”, also known as “rBGH”) convinced the 
Second Circuit to strike down a rBST labeling requirement for milk 
that, they argued, functioned as a scarlet letter.83  Labeling may 
encourage otherwise uninterested consumers to think, mistakenly, 
 
at least when prompted with its categories, but did not necessarily use it to select higher-graded 
cuts of beef, perhaps because high grades did not correlate with taste preferences).  But see T.R. 
Neely et al., Beef Customer Satisfaction: Role of Cut, USDA Quality Grade, and City on In-Home 
Consumer Ratings, 76 J. ANIMAL SCI. 1027, 1033 (1998) (finding that grade didn’t affect 
consumer satisfaction on every cut). 
 79. See, e.g., Mark Schatzker, Raising the Steaks, SLATE, Nov. 1, 2006, http://www.slate 
.com/id/2152674. 
 80. See Miller, J. et al., supra note 78, at 29. 
 81. See id.  Labeling’s effects on retail availability can be substantial, especially when the 
label acts as a warning.  Some groceries will only carry milk produced without use of 
recombinant bovine growth hormone (discussed infra notes 83–86 and accompanying text).  See 
Henry I. Miller, Don’t Cry Over rBST Milk, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007 (referring to this as “pre-
empting consumers’ ability to choose on the basis of price”).  Many major retailers don’t stock 
music CDs with parental advisory stickers.  See Kenneth A. Paulson, Regulation Through 
Intimidation: Congressional Hearings and Political Pressure on America’s Entertainment Media, 
7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 61, 77 (2004).  Likewise, many retailers refuse to stock M (mature) 
rated videogames, and almost none carry AO (adults only).  See Allie Shah, “San Andreas” Gets 
Adult Rating, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 21, 2005, at A1; Mary Jane Irwin, What’s So 
Wrong with the ESRB?, Feb. 7, 2006, http://www.1up.com/do/feature?cId=3147767.. 
 82. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 556 (2005); see also Cochran v. 
Veneman, 359 F.3d 263, 266–67 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing the divergence of opinion about milk 
between traditional and industrial dairy producers); Mich. Pork Producers v. Campaign for 
Family Farms, 229 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (discussing hogs from family farms 
versus industrially farmed hogs). 
 83. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding 
“consumer curiosity” was insufficient justification to require retailers to label milk from cows 
given certain bovine hormones); cf. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 
2001) (finding statute requiring labels to disclose the presence of mercury and the environmental 
impact of recycling products containing mercury to “better inform consumers” did not violate the 
First Amendment). 
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that rBST involves health risks—they may reason that there would 
be no label if it didn’t make a difference.84  Thus, Monsanto, the 
major producer of rBST, resisted labeling and also brought false 
advertising claims against smaller dairies with non-treated cows who 
voluntarily labeled their own milk.85  In addition, Monsanto recently 
asked the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to act against 
other voluntary labeling.86 
“Not treated with rBST” is a factual statement, but its truth or 
falsity is not the key question.  The dispute is over whether the 
implications of “not treated with rBST” mislead consumers and 
distort their purchases.87  It is for this reason that the FDA’s 
voluntary draft guidance on food containing genetically modified 
organisms (“GMO”), released January 2001 and unchanged since 
then, not only does not mandate labeling of GMO foods, but also 
suggests that labeling non-GMO foods as such might be false 
advertising.88  The FDA has determined that GMO foods generally 
 
 84. See infra note 87. 
 85. See Douglas Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the 
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 579 (2004). 
 86. See Christopher Wanjek, Crying over Labeled Milk, LIVESCIENCE, Apr. 24, 2007, 
http://www.livescience.com/health/070424_bad_labeling.html (“Monsanto, the multinational 
biotechnology corporation and leading producer of genetically engineered seed with a near 
monopoly on many crops and annual revenue exceeding $7 billion, is worried that you are being 
misled.  For this reason, the company wants to ban shady dairy farmers like those rascally Amish 
and weirdo hippies from labeling their products free of artificial hormones.  Earlier this month, 
Monsanto complained to the Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Committee about 
the proliferation of labels with language such as ‘Our Farmers’ Pledge: No Artificial Growth 
Hormones,’ as found on milk sold by Oakhurst Dairy in Portland, Maine.  Monsanto says this 
scares consumers into thinking there’s something unhealthy about its human-made recombinant 
bovine growth hormone (rBGH) . . . .”). 
 87. See Miller, supra note 81 (arguing that because milk from treated cows is safe and 
cheaper to produce and to buy, labeling distorts the market and harms the environment by 
inducing consumers to pay more for milk from untreated cows); see also African-American 
Organization Urges FDA to Stop Deceptive Marketing of “,o rBST” Milk, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 
14, 2006, http://sev.prnewswire.com/health-care-hospitals/20061214/DCTH04914122006-1.html 
(National Organization for African Americans in Housing argues that labeling allows exploitation 
of poor people who must choose between low prices and the appearance, but not the reality, of 
safer milk: “‘Not only does this deceptive practice impose a needless financial burden on low-
income consumers, it is generating unnecessary confusion and anxiety,’ [Board Secretary Kevin] 
Marchman added. . . .  Marchman is urging the FDA to put a halt to the ‘deceptive’ practice, 
saying that it ‘cheats consumers and raises unwarranted fears.’”). 
 88. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY VOLUNTARY LABELING INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR 
HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED USING BIOENGINEERING (2001), available at http:// 
www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/biolabgu.html; see also Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of 
Milk and Milk Products from Cows That Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine 
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pose no special or different risks, and labeling non-GMO foods could 
mislead consumers to think otherwise.89  Whether or not it is right, 
the FDA’s position is typical of standard-setting in advertising: In 
assessing truth or falsity, it is wholesale, governing an entire 
category of products based on a single instance of factfinding about 
the safety of GMO foods.  In assessing misleadingness, it is based on 
guesses (possibly informed) about consumer perception, including 
the general proposition that consumers usually think that labels 
communicate relevant information,90 rather than on surveys assessing 
consumer understandings of specific terms at a particular time.91 
One reason to criticize the FDA’s guidance is that consumers 
might care about more than just food safety.  Consumers with 
concerns over the increased industrialization of the food supply, the 
vulnerability of monocultures, and the environmental effects of 
GMO foods, among other things, might benefit from “non-GMO” 
labels even if GMO foods are just as safe for human consumption as 
non-GMO foods.92  But it is important to acknowledge that even if 
this criticism is correct, labeling could mislead consumers, albeit 
differently.  Establishing that some consumers wish to avoid GMO 
foods (or milk from rBST-treated cows) on non-safety grounds does 
 
Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279, 6280 (Feb. 10, 1994) (raising similar objections to “no rBST” 
labels). 
 89. See Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. v. Lumpkin, No. 96 C 2748, 1996 WL 495554, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 1996) (raising this argument); cf. Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer 
Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting a false 
advertising claim based on ads that touted Tums as “aluminum-free” in contrast to other antacids, 
but made no express representations that there was anything wrong with aluminum content). 
 90. See H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 45 (P. Cole & J. 
Morgan eds., 1975).  Grice proposed that we generally interpret conversations as cooperative 
endeavors, so that statements are by default relevant and truthful.  Advertising law often assesses 
truth and misleadingness in Gricean terms, so that if an ad makes an explicit claim, consumers are 
entitled to infer that it is relevant to whether or not they should buy the advertised product.  See 
Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and ,ondisclosure in 
Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 601–03 (2006). 
 91. This is not to say that individual word-specific surveys are more reliable.  Not only are 
surveys highly manipulable, leading Judge Posner to describe them as products of the “black 
arts,” Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 410, 
416 (7th Cir. 1994), they are no better (and possibly worse) than regulations at responding to 
change in meaning over time. 
 92. See Dan L. Burk, The Milk Free Zone: Federal and Local Interests in Regulating 
Recombinant bST, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. LAW 227 (1997); Kysar, supra note 85; cf. Int’l Dairy 
Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 75–78 (2d Cir. 1996) (Leval, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
similar concerns about milk from cows treated with rBST justified Vermont’s labeling 
requirement). 
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nothing to refute either of the FDA’s major premises: such foods are 
safe, and labeling will mislead some significant number of 
consumers about safety.  If those consumers care about safety but not 
about industrialization, monocultures, and so on, then labeling hurts 
them while helping the consumers who do care about those things.93  
And I have even set aside the issue of preference formation, as free-
speech libertarians would urge: the tradeoffs here come from 
mistakes of fact, not of value, though of course labels also serve as 
statements about what consumers ought to value. 
Another example of label regulation with obvious costs comes 
from the FDA’s refusal to distinguish between natural and artificially 
created trans fats.  Because butter contains some natural trans fat, 
products made with butter have to bear a “trans fat” label, even 
though the research that led to warnings about trans fats seems to 
apply only to artificially created trans fats.94  In order to avoid 
negative consumer reactions, some producers have switched from 
butter to margarine or other less healthy oils that do not require the 
“trans fat” label.95  Of course, most consumers may be unable or 
unwilling in practice to distinguish between natural and artificial 
trans fats, even if the FDA were to allow the extra labeling.  A more 
nuanced regulatory regime, while appealing logically, may be no 
better in an information-overloaded marketplace.  Information 
processing abilities are distinct from preferences and create other 
fault lines between consumers. 
Food is a rich source of examples of definitional problems, but 
there are many others.  I will close this section by mentioning a few.  
To the FDA, a drug is safe and effective for a particular use, and can 
be labeled as such, if that is shown by two “‘adequate and well-
controlled’ studies.”96  One study won’t do, nor will anecdotal 
evidence.97  Though individual doctors can prescribe and even 
proselytize based on their own experience with off-label uses of 
drugs, the drugs’ manufacturers can’t make claims unless they meet 
 
 93. For what it’s worth, my suspicion is that the more-than-safety consumers are wealthier 
than average, if only because they can afford to care about more than safety, which means that 
distributional concerns may also influence one’s view of whose interests to honor. 
 94. See Kim Severson, Trans Fat Fight Claims Butter as a Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 
2007, at F1. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 97. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 630 (1973). 
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the FDA’s standards, lest they be deemed to have misbranded the 
drugs.98  Is the FDA suppressing truthful information, or defining 
what “safe and effective” means, or both?  Likewise, miles per 
gallon and milligrams of tar are measurement systems chosen by the 
government from various alternatives.99  An advertiser can’t simply 
use other measurements, even though the government standards have 
known flaws, and even if the advertiser tells the consumer that it 
isn’t using the conventional measurement.100 
III.  IMPLICATIONS: WHICH, THEN, IS TO BE MASTER? 
A.  Links Between Deception 
and Public Policy Preferences 
The examples in the previous Part illustrate the vast range of 
situations in which truth and falsity, even for a single term, are hotly 
contested.  Falsity aside, sometimes the government regulates out of 
a direct worry over the deceptive effects of literally true speech, or 
speech that is true from a certain point of view.101  “Dolphin-safe” 
 
 98. See Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 226 F. Supp. 2d 
204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining that the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act requires 
FDA approval of the drug as “safe and effective” before it can be marketed for a particular use). 
 99. See 16 C.F.R. § 259.2(c)(1) (2007) (requiring car advertisers using unapproved fuel 
economy standards to include official miles-per-gallon estimates and give them “substantially 
more prominence” than the unapproved standard); Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 9 
(Ill. 2005) (“[T]he FTC, in 1967, adopted the ‘Cambridge Method’ (FTC method) as the single 
acceptable means of measuring tar and nicotine yields in cigarettes.  The record is clear that both 
the FTC and the cigarette manufacturers were aware at that time that no method of measurement, 
including the FTC method, could accurately predict the actual exposure of individual smokers 
who smoked any particular brand of cigarette.  The variations in smoking habits, including the 
phenomenon of compensation, are simply too complex to account for in any uniform test.  
However, despite this awareness that the test data would not be accurate as to any individual 
smoker, the FTC found this concern outweighed by the need for a basis for comparison among 
brands.  Thus, the FTC method was adopted for the purpose of providing a consistent benchmark, 
not as a means of measuring the actual exposure of individual smokers to tar and nicotine.”); 
Craswell, supra note 90, at 588–90 (discussing tradeoffs in choosing a single measure) 
Fueleconomy.gov, Your Mileage Will Still Vary, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/ 
feg/why_differ.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2007) (“EPA tests are designed [to] reflect ‘typical’ 
driving conditions and driver behavior, but several factors can affect MPG significantly . . . .”). 
 100. See, e.g., § 259.2(c)(1); Price, 848 N.E.2d at 9.  This is a reasonable rule, since more 
information might not produce more consumer understanding.  Adding clarifying information 
itself poses costs; it may be ignored by information-overloaded consumers, and it may even 
interfere with consumers’ ability to evaluate other aspects of a product or service.  See Craswell, 
supra note 90, at 581–84, 594–600. 
 101. Cf. RETURN OF THE JEDI (Lucasfilm 1983) (“Your father was seduced by the dark side of 
the Force.  He ceased to be Anakin Skywalker and became Darth Vader.  When that happened, 
the good man who was your father was destroyed.  So, what I told you was true—from a certain 
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tuna provides an example.102  It’s possible that the tuna makers could 
eventually change the meaning of the term for consumers to include 
“tuna caught in nets that didn’t happen to catch any dolphins,” but 
that might take a lot of time and cause substantial confusion in the 
interim.103  Moreover, reliance on changing consumer perceptions 
would also make it harder for producers who used safer fishing 
techniques to explain the advantages of their version of dolphin-safe 
tuna, which would have the added disadvantage of being more 
expensive because of the different production method.  Because of 
those considerations, government regulation of the use of the term is 
the fairest and most efficient way of avoiding deception. 
Other times, government regulates out of concern over 
communication itself, reasoning that a fixed standard—as long as it’s 
reasonable—is in consumers’ interests because fixed standards 
decrease “noise” regardless of deception.104  Consumers often benefit 
when they can make comparisons knowing, or assuming, that all 
producers use the same standard, whether for organic food or car 
mileage or milligrams of tar.105  This has costs in fixing meaning and 
 
point of view.”).  Like Luke Skywalker, many of us feel deceived when we learn exactly what 
“point of view” a speaker (like Bill Clinton) has been using, unknown to us; others can learn to 
see the same way. 
 102. See Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385(b)(3) (2007) 
(“[C]onsumers would like to know if the tuna they purchase is falsely labeled as to the effect of 
the harvesting of the tuna on dolphins.”). 
 103. Cf. Hughes, supra note 58, at 336–37 (discussing the benefits of stable meaning for 
consumers, including greater payoffs from investing in learning what terms mean). 
 104. See Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and 
Coerced Commercial Associations in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood 40 Val. U. L. Rev. 
555, 562 (2006) (“[F]requently the disclosure of information is required in order to promote 
transparent and efficient markets.” (citing David S. Rudner, Balancing Investor Protection with 
Capital Formation ,eeds After the SEC Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REV. 39, 64 
(2005); 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful 
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various 
credit terms available to him . . . .”))); id. at 584–85 & nn.133–36 (offering other examples of 
mandatory disclosures designed to improve consumer understanding and enhance market 
efficiency). 
 105. See, e.g., Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2005) (explaining the FTC’s 
decision to provide a “consistent benchmark” for consumers by regulating the means of 
measuring tar); cf. Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,638 (Dec. 21, 
1978) (“[B]y establishing a uniform, minimal set of required information, disclosure requirements 
enhance the efficiency of markets by facilitating comparison . . . .”).  Sometimes flexibility in 
meaning is appropriate.  Eric Goldman, for example, discusses situations in which internet users’ 
choice of trademarks as search terms have multiple meanings, arguing that the trademark owner 
should not control advertising targeted to such searches.  See Eric Goldman, Deregulating 
Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 521-25 (2005).  I agree with Goldman 
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possibly deterring improvements that won’t show up on the standard 
measures,106 but it also has all the benefits that standardization 
usually allows. 
Nor can deception and standard setting be neatly divided.  In 
many instances, as with “Made in U.S.A.” and “organic,” the two 
objectives go together.  Consumers have some idea of what “Made in 
U.S.A.” means, and legislatures want to protect them from deception 
and simultaneously encourage U.S. manufacturing  The very 
presence of “Made in U.S.A.” on a label is an implicit argument that 
U.S. manufacture is a desirable product characteristic, as is 
“organic,” “rBST free,” and other promotional phrases.  Thus, even 
if government mandates succeed in fixing meaning such that 
consumers are not deceived by varying definitions of particular 
terms, they may be deceived about the implications of such terms, 
including whether milk produced without rBST is safer to drink, 
which is a matter of direct concern to virtually all milk consumers.  
Regulations of the meaning of terms simultaneously enforce and 
shape consumer preferences.107  Protection against fraud and what 
some call paternalism are inseparable in practice.108  This is one 
 
on trademark owners’ rights, but I still believe that uniform definitions of terms used to describe 
products and services can aid consumers.  
 106. Cf. Hughes, supra note 58, at 338 (noting that regulation-backed stability of meaning in 
geographical indications deters innovation). 
 107. Labeling’s preference-shaping effects are so significant that they are beginning to play 
an important role in international trade regulation.  See Kysar, supra note 85, at 579 (“By 
influencing the amount of information that must or may be disclosed to consumers regarding 
product manufacturing practices, governments also influence the patterns of consumer preference 
that emerge following the regulatory decision.”); Atsuko Okubo, Environmental Labeling 
Proposals and the GATT/WTO Regime, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 599, 621 (1999) (“[S]ome 
producers are at risk of losing their positions in the market due to consumer behavior favoring 
labeled products.  This leads to debate over whether voluntary environmental labeling or eco-
labeling acts as a de facto non-tariff trade barrier.  Despite their non-mandatory status, eco-
labeling programs still potentially have a major influence on conditions of competition in a 
market; eco-labeling could create a situation where both final consumers and retailers prefer to 
buy and stock only labeled products, and as a result, producers have difficulty finding buyers for 
their non-labeled products.”). 
 108. Mike Seidman suggested to me that the favorable connotations of these terms are social 
facts, and thus regulation is not paternalistic if it merely requires truthful use of the terms on 
products seeking to take advantage of those social facts.  I am sympathetic to this perspective, but 
I think it unlikely that most consumers have a preexisting concept of “rBST free.”  The advertiser 
is using the labeling as a signal about what consumers should value.  Even when consumers do 
have preexisting commitments, as with “Made in U.S.A.,” regulators know virtually nothing 
about how they would define “Made in U.S.A.”  Does a product assembled in the U.S. with 
screws made in Taiwan count?  What if some consumers think it does and others think it doesn’t?  
Again, regulating use of the term creates a certain meaning, but it’s unlikely that consumers know 
or endorse its precise contours. 
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reason that providing full constitutional protection to commercial 
speech would have far-reaching and, in my opinion, undesirable 
consequences—extirpating government attempts to shape citizens’ 
preferences also requires leaving many of us vulnerable to deception. 
Some consumers care about particular product characteristics 
already, whereas others may begin to care as the result of 
government-encouraged labeling.  But that’s not the only way in 
which consumers vary.  Information, or lack of information, that 
helps some also hurts others.  Many consumers benefit from the 
government’s system of grades for meat, but more discerning 
consumers may suffer because they can’t get information about the 
differences at the highest end.109  We choose whom to help by 
regulating or by refraining from regulation. 
Moreover, the substantive effects of advertising regulations 
inform our judgments about whether particular claims are true or 
false.  That is one reason the judges interpreting “Made in U.S.A.” 
considered the effects of their ruling on U.S. manufacturing jobs.  
Regulations of “Cajun” and other geographical indications affect, as 
well as enforce, expectations about whether a term identifies a 
regional origin or a type of product.  Because tying products to 
particular locations can raise prices and make it harder for consumers 
to identify substitutes with identical or nearly identical qualities,110 
one’s assessment of the wisdom of this practice will affect one’s 
judgment of whether it’s false to call cheese “feta” if it’s not from 
Greece.111 
B.  Can Our Objectives Be Achieved 
Without Pervasive Commercial Speech Regulation? 
Critics of commercial speech doctrine might argue that we 
should carry out social policies through non-speech regulation such 
as subsidies for organic agriculture or bans on abortion (if otherwise 
 
 109. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Hughes, supra note 58, at 345–47 (discussing protection for geographical indications 
as a form of subsidy to producers); id. at 352–54 (discussing the ways in which geographical 
terms come to designate product qualities rather than geographical origin, such that similar 
products are available from many sources). 
 111. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Stephen R. Munzer, The Global Struggle over Geographic 
Indications, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 337 (2007) (criticizing the scope of European demands for GI 
protection). 
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constitutional).112  Sellers could use any definition of “organic” or 
“Made in U.S.A.” they wanted, short of deliberate fraud, but only 
approved producers would receive the subsidy, which would have to 
be large enough to offset the cost savings from cheaper production 
methods.113  The government could also offer a voluntary 
certification for a term.  Presumably, though, approved producers 
would be allowed to advertise their official imprimatur, whether it 
came in the form of qualifying for subsidy or qualifying for 
certification, and that would return us to paternalistic preference 
shaping through government definitions of terms.114 
If consumers paid attention to the different labels, then the 
effects of a voluntary system would be quite similar to those of a 
mandatory one (which explains why milk producers who use rBST 
both fought government-mandated labeling and sued small dairies 
for labeling their milk “rBST free” on their own initiative).  If 
consumers treated the different labels as the same, by contrast, they 
would be deceived, because there would be differences between 
government-approved and unapproved products.  It is only if 
consumers don’t really care about the meaning of terms that varying 
labels are both ineffective and harmless.  What is most likely, of 
course, is that different consumers react differently, making the 
tradeoffs harder to calculate, but still ever-present. 
The libertarian response is simple: consumers should educate 
themselves, in a return to the old rule of caveat emptor.115  Modern 
trademark law, which is steadily driving towards the conclusion that 
trademark owners can control every mention of their marks in the 
name of protecting consumers against confusion, offers an example 
 
 112. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371–73 (2002) (discussing the 
Court’s preference for non-speech regulation to achieve the same ends as speech regulation). 
 113. The subsidy approach would make it difficult to further more than one policy per 
product; for example, an organic grape grower from Argentina would compete with a domestic 
grape grower. 
 114. The assumption here (probably accurate) is that government would be less likely to take 
any regulatory action at all in such a world, and that paternalism would decrease by shrinking 
government in general. 
 115. Critiques and defenses of paternalism in false advertising law are widespread, though 
they are beyond the scope of this article; there are several excellent articles on the overall wisdom 
of advertising regulation.  See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising 
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1 
(1992); Lee Goldman, The World’s Best Article on Competitor Suits for False Advertising, 45 
FLA. L. REV. 487 (1993); Roger E. Schechter, Additional Pieces of the Deception Puzzle: Some 
Reactions to Professor BeVier, 78 VA. L. REV. 57 (1992). 
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of an overprotective legal regime that encourages consumers not to 
think for themselves, to our overall detriment.116  And it is certainly 
true that protecting consumers against every form of 
misunderstanding is impossible, and that expansive interpretations of 
the Lanham Act can hamper free competition or suppress artistic and 
political speech. 
Yet despite the risks of overprotection, we abandoned caveat 
emptor for good reasons.  No one could possibly investigate every 
ambiguous claim about product composition or performance.  When 
the claims are unverifiable by individual research (e.g., what mileage 
a make of car gets on average; whether a drug works), then in the 
absence of legal mandates the self-protective measure is to distrust 
any such claims.  This is the problem of the market for lemons, 
where an inability to distinguish between valid and invalid claims 
means that the market for good products and truthful claims fails to 
develop.117  This is both inefficient and unhelpful to the exercise of 
consumer autonomy.118  Moreover, even libertarians generally accept 
the continued existence of a fraud action;119 at some point, a seller 
who knows that many consumers interpret a claim in a particular 
way is committing fraud.  The problems of interpretation discussed 
in this article are persistent even in the world of caveat emptor, for 
all that defendants are more likely to win in such a world. 
Another solution to the problem would be to focus on who gets 
to decide what is false: a government agency, the legislature, a jury, 
or a judge.  With a fraud statute or common-law claim, a jury, rather 
than an administrative agency or legislature, decides whether 
particular representations are false.  A return to a fraud baseline 
solves the problem of definition by changing the question.  That isn’t 
a real answer, because the decision makers on whom we rely will 
have to decide whose meaning to endorse.  My own suspicion is that 
juries may not be better at this, and may systematically be worse than 
agencies with experience evaluating a variety of advertising claims 
over time.  Requiring individualized assessments could also create a 
substantial problem of verdict conflicts. for example, if one jury 
 
 116. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721 (2004).  I thank 
Mark McKenna for pressing me on this point. 
 117. See generally Akerlof, supra note 71. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See generally Kozinski & Banner, supra note 5. 
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defined “Made in U.S.A.” differently than another, or one jury found 
“no rSBT” labels on one brand of milk misleading, while another 
found the same label truthful on a different brand.120 
IV.  DEFENDING ADVERTISING LAW AGAINST FIRST AMENDMENT 
INROADS 
Even people who advocate full constitutional protection for 
commercial speech usually want to preserve the cause of action for 
fraud.121  Heightened scienter requirements—actual malice, in 
defamation’s terms, meaning knowledge or reckless indifference to 
falsity—will of course defeat many such fraud claims, even when 
advertising is false.  But even assuming, as full-protection advocates 
might claim, that it will be relatively easy to establish the necessary 
mens rea when it comes to core factual claims about the composition 
or performance of a product, the problems of proof will not end 
there.  Problems of definition, as set forth above, will remain.  As a 
result, an advertiser who has a plausible claim that a word could 
mean what he says it means will have a strong defense against a suit 
for fraud.122  The requirements of actual malice would only magnify 
the defendant-protective effects of uncertainty. 
 
 120. Of course, opponents of the current commercial speech doctrine also usually oppose 
consumer class actions, which are often the only way to litigate consumer fraud claims for 
otherwise small amounts.  Recent legislative and judicial trends make it extremely difficult to 
maintain such class actions, and a heightened focus on common law requirements like individual 
reliance and causation, which would seem to be implied by political-speech-like status for 
commercial speech, would make the situation even worse.  As a practical matter, consumer fraud 
claims are not currently very robust mechanisms for deterring fraudulent speech, any more than 
libel or “political fraud” claims impose constraints on political speech. 
 121. Some critics of the commercial speech doctrine do essentially admit that fraud laws 
would have to contract or even disappear in a full-protection world.  See Aaron A. Goach, Recent 
Developments, Free Speech and Freer Speech: Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. 
Ct. 2130 (1997), 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 623, 635 (1995) (arguing that counterspeech is the 
solution to commercial fraud); see also Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: 
A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1112–15 
(2006) (discussing problems with punishing fraud in fully protected speech). 
 122. See, e.g., Onyx Acceptance Corp. v. Trump Hotel & Casino Resorts, Inc., 2008 WL 
649024 (N.J. Super. A.D.) (finding a consumer protection law violation, but not fraud, when a 
hotel’s undisclosed definition of “guaranteed” led to substantial damages when the plaintiff’s 
guaranteed reservations were not honored; although the hotel’s definition was unreasonable and 
“Orwellian,” it did not intend to dishonor the reservations at the time it promised a guarantee); cf. 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 
Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 156 (“Misleading commercial speech does not amount to 
the kind of fraud that warrants government intervention under standard libertarian theory.”). 
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Another way to look at the radical implications of ending the 
commercial/noncommercial divide is to compare false advertising 
law to other causes of action that have been fully enveloped by the 
First Amendment.  Advertising persistently makes promises that will 
be nonmisleading or even helpful to some people, while misleading 
some other group.  From a regulatory perspective, it may make sense 
to bar a claim when more people are misled than helped, or when the 
number of people misled is of sufficient absolute size regardless of 
the number helped.  False advertising regulations and trademark law 
generally take the latter tack today. 
But in regulating political speech, if speech informs a group of 
any size at all, it would generally be considered illegitimate to punish 
that speech.  The Supreme Court has protected speech that a 
reasonable person might interpret as incitement to immediate 
violence when it deemed that the speech was not actually 
incitement.123  Such speech can be useful to part of the audience even 
if it harms other listeners, for example by causing them to leave the 
audience for fear of violence.  More recently, in Federal Election 
Commission v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc.,124 the Supreme Court 
exempted “issue ads” from campaign finance regulation if a 
reasonable person could interpret them in a way that does not 
advocate voting for or against a particular candidate.125  This 
standard, aside from allowing courts to avoid assessing actual 
audience perception, explicitly provides for the existence of multiple 
reasonable interpretations, one of which will always trump the 
others.126  Some reasonable viewers will interpret an unregulable ad 
 
 123. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107–09 (1973) (holding that street protestor couldn’t 
be prosecuted for disorderly conduct for yelling “‘We’ll take the fucking street later (or again)’” 
when law enforcement was trying to clear the street of an antiwar protest because at worst it was 
a call for illegal action in the indefinite future); id. at 111 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Surely the 
sentence ‘We’ll take the fucking street later (or again)’ is susceptible of characterization as an 
exhortation, particularly when uttered in a loud voice while facing a crowd. . . .  Perhaps, as [two] 
witnesses and the majority opinion seem to suggest, appellant was simply expressing his views to 
the world at large, but that is surely not the only rational explanation.”). 
 124. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
 125. Id. at 2667. 
 126. For an example of the Court’s use of one interpretation to trump other possible 
interpretations in the service of speech suppression, see Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 
(2007).  Morse held that a student could be punished for displaying a banner marked “Bong Hits 
4 Jesus” because his school’s principal interpreted this as advocacy of illegal drug use.  See id. at 
2646–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is one thing to restrict speech that advocates drug use.  It 
is another thing entirely to prohibit an obscure message with a drug theme that a third party 
subjectively—and not very reasonably—thinks is tantamount to express advocacy. . . .  To the 
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as urging them to vote for or against an identified candidate, even 
though that interpretation generates the harms the law was designed 
to avoid. 
In the law of defamation, similarly, a statement is protected if it 
lacks defamatory meaning.127  But courts do not inquire into the 
percentage of an audience that interprets challenged statements as 
defamatory, nor do they engage in anything approaching an 
empirical analysis of how meanings are made.128  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court routinely fails to engage in any serious analysis of an 
audience’s perceptions, relying instead on often unarticulated 
guesses about what the audience would understand.  Many observers 
will regard flag burning as nothing more than an inarticulate grunt, 
but some will understand it as conveying a political message.129  The 
Supreme Court engaged in no balancing of interests between groups 
whose interpretations of flag burning differed, but instead prioritized 
the interests of those who interpreted it as political speech, even 
though they may be a tiny minority.130  In another case involving an 
anonymous political handbill, the Court simply concluded that there 
was nothing misleading about the handbill, even though the 
anonymity itself could be misleading.131  By treating the audience as 
 
extent the Court defers to the principal’s ostensibly reasonable judgment, it abdicates its 
constitutional responsibility.  The beliefs of third parties, reasonable or otherwise, have never 
dictated which messages amount to proscribable advocacy.”). 
 127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 cmt. b (1977). 
 128. Courts routinely articulate a standard that requires them to assess how the audience 
would interpret an allegedly defamatory statement, but do not require any empirical evidence of 
audience reaction.  See, e.g., Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1988) (holding that 
in determining defamatory meaning, a court must identify the “fair and natural meaning which 
will be given [a statement] by reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence”). 
 129. The Supreme Court has held that expressive conduct’s entitlement to First Amendment 
protection depends in part on whether an audience would understand the conduct as 
communicative.  See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 (1989) (flagburning is expressive 
conduct); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (painting a peace sign on a flag is 
protected expression). 
 130. See, e.g., Spence, 418 U.S. at 413 (“[F]or the great majority of us, the flag is a symbol of 
patriotism . . . .  For others the flag carries . . . a different message.”). 
 131. See Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 566, 
580–81 (1995) (deciding that organizers of St. Patrick’s Day parade’s organizers could exclude a 
gay and lesbian group from marching because their overt participation would distort the parade’s 
message, but failing to discuss why the audience would receive a distorted message); Lyrissa 
Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1537, 1546–47 (2007) (“[T]he audience for anonymous speech is essentially a 
construct.  The Court did not consult poll data or experts before deciding that Margaret 
McIntyre’s handbill would not mislead or fool the voters who received it. . . .  The Court’s theory 
of audience response to anonymous speech is a critical underpinning of the McIntyre decision, 
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if it would, as an empirical matter, perceive and respond to speech in 
a way obviating the need for government regulation, the Court has 
signaled indifference to the evidence about how audiences actually 
do interpret messages—which is to say, badly and inconsistently. 
This imagined supremely competent audience may well be 
necessary in political speech doctrine because the government can’t 
be trusted to regulate political speech, but it fits very poorly with 
modern consumer protection law, which is designed to protect 
average consumers, not ideal consumers.  There plainly are risks of 
mistake, agency capture, and other public choice problems that make 
it unwise to assume that the government is always a superior 
factfinder.  Yet modern advertising regulation depends on how a 
regulator—a jury or agency—expects real consumers to react to 
particular claims.  If we did import into commercial speech 
regulation the normative, aspirational view of the audience found in 
political speech doctrine, there wouldn’t be much left of fraud 
claims, let alone systematic government standard-setting. 
First Amendment law tends to protect speech as soon as an 
audience benefit is identified, unless some other non-speech interest 
outweighs that benefit.  But advertising regulation often affects both 
deceived consumers and informed consumers, in situations where 
advertising cannot be segregated so that it only reaches those who 
will interpret it correctly.  Free speech doctrine has few tools to 
identify which is to be master in such situations.  As a result, the 
consequence of turning false advertising law into a subtopic of First 
Amendment law would be a substantial, possibly near-total, 
contraction of its scope.  Whether this is desirable or not, it needs to 
be acknowledged.  At the least, advocates of full constitutional 
protection for commercial speech need to explain what they mean 
when they say that commercial fraud would still be actionable in 
their proposed constitutional regime. 
 
but the Court never spells out the full implications of the theory.”); Randall P. Bezanson, 
Speaking Through Others’ Voices: Authorship, Originality, and Free Speech, 38 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 983, 1013 (2003) (“[I]n order to make an educated guess about the likelihood of 
misattribution, the Court would have to consider the socio-political context in which the 
audiences viewed the parade, and would have to engage in a cultural analysis to determine 
whether GLIB’s participation in the annual parade would arguably hold symbolic significance for 
the relevant community. . . .  [G]iven the variety of audience reactions to any single message—
particularly cultural dramas unaccompanied by explicit, preexisting statements of intent or 
purpose—such an analysis strikes one as an unlikely project . . . .  It is extraordinarily difficult to 
predict causation or audience reaction.”). 
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